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OF TRUTH, PRAGMATISM, AND SOUR
GRAPES: THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S DECISION
IN SEC V. CITIGROUP GLOBAL MARKETS
THEODORE D. EDWARDS†
ABSTRACT
In his 2001 letter to Berkshire Hathaway shareholders Warren
Buffett stated, “[Y]ou only find out who is swimming naked when the
1
tide goes out.” In the fall of 2008, the tide went out when Lehman
Brothers collapsed and credit markets froze. Left exposed were the
shoddy—and sometimes fraudulent—practices of participants in the
theretofore esoteric industry of structured finance. Since then, the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has extracted billions of
dollars in settlements from the industry. A frequent enforcement tool
of the SEC has been the consent judgment, a hybrid settlement that
contains injunctive elements.
This Note examines the role of the SEC in relation to Article III
courts, specifically in the context of consent judgments. Drawing on
the rich history of equitable practice and the doctrine of the separation
of powers, this Note argues that SEC v. Citigroup Global Markets
was wrongly decided in that it excessively curtails the role of district
courts in determining the propriety of equitable relief. The opinion
not only contradicts longstanding precedent, but also goes too far in
ceding a core function of the judiciary to the SEC. This Note shows
that, as a result, the decision serves to undermine fundamental goals
of the securities laws.
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INTRODUCTION
In the run-up to the global financial crisis of 2008, Citigroup
Global Markets, Inc. (Citi) sold long positions in negatively
forecasted mortgage-backed assets to investors, in a product known
2
as “Class V Funding III” (the Fund). Citi claimed that the assets
comprising the fund were selected by an independent third party,
when in fact they were selected by Citi itself in an effort to unload
3
poorly projected assets. Further, and perhaps most egregiously, Citi
took short positions in the same assets it sold long to investors as part
4
of the Fund. As a result of this fraud, investors lost over $700 million
5
and Citi realized over $160 million in profits.
The SEC brought parallel enforcement actions against Citi and
trader Brian Stoker in October 2011, seeking, inter alia, injunctions
6
authorized by Section 20(b) of the Securities Act of 1933. District
Judge Jed Rakoff initially refused to invoke the court’s injunctive
power to approve a pre-negotiated settlement where the settlement
7
was unsupported by facts. Both the SEC and Citi took interlocutory
8
9
appeals. The Second Circuit, in SEC v. Citigroup Global Markets,
ultimately held that Judge Rakoff abused his discretion by refusing a
10
settlement between a public agency and a defendant. In response to
Judge Rakoff’s overriding concern that the settlement contained
2. SEC v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc. (Citigroup IV), 752 F.3d 285, 289 (2d Cir. 2014).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 297 (“Although [the allegations] would appear to be tantamount to an allegation
of knowing and fraudulent intent . . . the S.E.C., for reasons of its own, chose to charge Citi only
with negligence . . . .” (quoting SEC v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328, 330
(S.D.N.Y. 2011))). Judge Rakoff described the SEC’s allegation as that of “a substantial
securities fraud.” Id.
6. See generally SEC v. Stoker, 865 F. Supp. 2d 457, 458 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (providing
background information and procedural history for both cases); see also Securities Act of 1933,
15 U.S.C. § 77t (2012) (authorizing the Commission to seek injunctions in the following
provisions: Section 20(b) of the Securities Act of 1933, Section 21(d) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, Section 209 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, and Section 42(d) of the
Investment Company Act of 1940).
7. SEC v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc. (Citigroup I), 827 F. Supp. 2d 328, 332 (S.D.N.Y.
2011).
8. In an initial appellate decision, the Second Circuit granted a stay sought by both Citi
and the SEC. Additionally, the panel withheld ruling on the merits and appointed pro bono
counsel to represent the district court’s position so that the merits panel would have the benefits
of adversarial briefing. SEC v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts. Inc. (Citigroup III), 673 F.3d 158, 161 (2d
Cir. 2012).
9. SEC v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc. (Citigroup IV), 752 F.3d 285 (2d Cir. 2014).
10. Id.
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sparse factual stipulations by which to measure it, the Second Circuit
proclaimed that “[t]rials are primarily about the truth. Consent
11
decrees are primarily about pragmatism.” Importantly, the Second
Circuit held that the SEC is the sole arbiter of what is, or is not, in the
12
public interest. It thus vacated and remanded Judge Rakoff’s
13
decision. With the menu so fixed, Judge Rakoff was left “with
14
nothing but sour grapes” and thus approved the consent judgment.
In SEC v. Citigroup Global Markets, the Second Circuit adopted
a new legal standard that excessively curtails the discretion of district
courts in evaluating consent judgments between government agencies
15
and defendants. Although the court boldly claimed that courts
16
should not merely “rubber stamp[]” the wishes of enforcement
agencies, it is hard to see how courts that abide by this precedent can
do anything but passively endorse government settlements. The
ruling cedes to the SEC the determination of the public interest,
which is the primary consideration in the decision to grant injunctive
relief. Consideration of the public interest has historically been a core
equitable function of the judiciary. The holding therefore contradicts
precedent and violates the separation-of-powers doctrine.
This Note demonstrates the flaws of the Citigroup ruling. Part I
explores the relationship between executive agencies and Article III
courts as it pertains to judgments and statutory injunctions. Part II
discusses SEC settlement practices, Judge Rakoff’s initial decision to
refuse the settlement, and the decision of the Second Circuit in
Citigroup. Part III draws on discussions from the previous Sections to
argue that Citigroup was wrongly decided.
I. AGENCIES & ARTICLE III COURTS
At the heart of the issue in Citigroup is a question of the role of
17
courts vis-à-vis agencies where consent judgments are concerned.
That is, how much discretion do courts retain when an executive

11. Id. at 295.
12. Id. at 296.
13. Id. at 298.
14. SEC v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts. Inc., 34 F. Supp. 3d 379, 381 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
15. Citigroup IV, 752 F.3d at 293.
16. Id. at 293 (quoting SEC v. Levine, 881 F.2d 1165, 1181 (2d Cir. 1989)).
17. See John C. Coffee Jr., Collision Course: The SEC and Judge Rakoff, N.Y. L.J. (Jan. 19,
2012) (“[Citigroup] poses fundamental questions about the relationship between administrative
agencies and federal courts.”).
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agency seeks injunctive relief authorized by statute? This Part
discusses precedent related to the doctrine of the separation of
powers and statutory injunctions in an effort to illuminate the
discussion in Part II.
A. Against Tyranny: The Doctrine of Separation of Powers
The Constitution established a government consisting of three
18
19
20
branches: the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary. The
branches were not intended to be entirely separate in all of their
roles, though each was designed to wield certain core functionalities
that were to be vigilantly guarded against usurpation by other
21
branches. In this way, the Framers intended to prevent the
22
concentration of power in any one branch. In Federalist 47, James
Madison states, “The accumulation of all powers, legislative,
executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or
many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly
23
be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.” In Federalist 51,
Madison laid out his vision for a system of government in which the

18. See U.S. CONST. art. I (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.”).
19. See id. art. II (“The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States
of America.”).
20. See id. art. III (“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme
Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish.”).
21. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 370 (1989) (“[T]he separation-of-powers
principle, and the nondelegation doctrine in particular, do not prevent Congress from obtaining
the assistance of its coordinate Branches.”); People v. Owens, 228 P.3d 969, 971–72 (Colo. 2010)
(stating that “separate branches of government cannot operate in mutually exclusive, watertight
compartments, but must cooperate with each other”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 101–05
(James Madison) (Michael A. Genovese ed., 2009) (refuting the idea that the branches of
government should be entirely distinct while also stating that core functions of each branch
should not be absorbed by other branches).
22. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 492 (2010)
(discussing the separation of powers doctrine as it applies to the executive); see also THE
FEDERALIST NO. 48, supra note 21, at 107 (James Madison) (“It is agreed on all sides, that the
powers properly belonging to one of the departments ought not to be directly and completely
administered by either of the other departments. It is equally evident, that none of them ought
to possess, directly or indirectly, an overruling influence over the others . . . .”).
23. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, supra note 21, at 101 (James Madison). Madison wrote under
the pseudonym Publius, Latin for “Friend of the People.” Publius was a Roman Consul who
helped to overthrow the Roman monarchy around 509 BC. ALBERT FURTWANGLER, THE
AUTHORITY OF PUBLIUS: A READING OF THE FEDERALIST PAPERS 51 (1984).

EDWARDS IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2/21/2016 10:17 PM

2016] OF TRUTH, PRAGMATISM, AND SOUR GRAPES

1245
24

constituent branches both balance and check one another. By
vesting each branch with “opposite and rival interests,” Madison
believed that the “great difficulty” of creating a government that
25
controls the governed as well as itself might be overcome.
The functions of the spheres of government are not mutually
exclusive, and some degree of overlap is essential to the practical
26
administration of government. Separation-of-powers doctrine is
inapplicable with respect to purely ministerial or administrative
27
functions. But one branch violates the doctrine when it usurps the
28
powers traditionally vested in another.
The Ninth Circuit, in a decision affirmed by the Supreme Court,
enunciated a clear standard for the separation-of-powers doctrine in
29
Chadha v. Immigration and Naturalization Service:
[W]e define a constitutional violation of the separation of powers as
an assumption by one branch of powers that are central or essential
to the operation of a coordinate branch, provided also that the
assumption disrupts the coordinate branch in the performance of its
duties and is unnecessary to implement a legitimate policy of the
30
Government.

Furthermore, when assumptions of power are sustained and routine,
31
a violation is “more easily established.” The standard in Chadha was
32
largely adopted from Nixon v. Administrator of General Services,
where the Supreme Court stated that the coordinate branches of
government were not intended to be totally independent, and that the
24. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 21, at 120 (James Madison) (Michael A.
Genovese ed., 2009) (“But the great security against a gradual concentration of the several
powers in the same department consists in giving to those who administer each department the
necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others.”).
25. Id.
26. For a further discussion of overlapping government functions, see supra note 21 and
accompanying text.
27. See Chadha v. INS, 634 F.2d 408, 424–25 (9th Cir. 1980), aff’d, 462 U.S. 919 (1983)
(stating that some actions “not implicating a suspect form or degree of power” are undeserving
of judicial attention).
28. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 398–402 (1989) (relying heavily on history
to inform separation of powers analysis); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel
Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 603 (1952) (“Deeply embedded traditional ways of conducting
government cannot supplant the Constitution or legislation, but they give meaning to the words
of a text or supply them.”).
29. Chadha v. INS, 634 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1980).
30. Id. at 425.
31. Id.
32. Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
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locus of the inquiry should be on the degree to which intrusion
33
prevents an aggrieved branch from fulfilling its constitutional duties.
34
In Heckler v. Chaney, the Supreme Court recognized a
presumption of unreviewability when an agency declines to initiate or
35
pursue an enforcement action. Prison inmates convicted of capital
crimes and sentenced to death by lethal injection alleged that use of
certain drugs for lethal injection violated the Food, Drug, and
36
Cosmetic Act and sued the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
37
to prevent their use. The FDA declined to take any enforcement
38
action. The D.C. Circuit held that the FDA’s decision not to pursue
the inmates’ claims was an abuse of discretion and remanded the case
39
so that the FDA would “fulfill its statutory function.”
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, began the
Court’s analysis with the Administrative Procedure Act’s thresholds
for judicial review of agency enforcement actions: there is a
presumption of reviewability of agency enforcement actions unless
review is expressly precluded in the relevant statute or the action is
40
committed to agency discretion by law. Actions may be deemed to
41
be committed to agency discretion when there is “no law to apply.”
The Court faulted the D.C. Circuit for its narrow construction of the
“no law to apply” test in this case because that test is more aptly
suited for instances concerning affirmative agency enforcement
42
actions, as opposed to when an agency chooses not to act. The Court
reminded that it had long recognized a presumption in favor of
43
unreviewability when agencies decide not to act.
33. See id. (“In designing the structure of our Government and dividing and allocating the
sovereign power among three coequal branches, the Framers of the Constitution sought to
provide a comprehensive system, but the separate powers were not intended to operate with
absolute independence.” (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974))).
34. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
35. Id. at 823.
36. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938)
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399 (2012)).
37. Chaney, 470 U.S. at 823.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 826 (quoting Chaney v. Heckler, 718 F.2d 1174, 1191 (D.C. Cir. 1983)).
40. Chaney, 470 U.S. at 828; see 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1)–(2) (2012) (restricting judicial review
under the APA in these two scenarios).
41. Id. at 830 (quoting Chaney, 718 F.2d at 1184); see also Citizens to Pres. Overton Park,
Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971) (recognizing actions that are “committed to agency
discretion” as “very narrow exception[s]” to the general rule of judicial reviewability).
42. Chaney, 470 U.S. at 831.
43. Id.
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The Court offered three reasons supporting this presumption.
First, agencies are uniquely situated to balance factors “which are
peculiarly within [their] expertise,” such as the cost of resources,
44
likelihood of success, and opportunity costs. Second, decisions not to
take enforcement actions do not involve “coercive power over an
individual’s liberty or property rights, and thus [do] not infringe upon
45
areas that courts often are called upon to protect.” Finally, the Court
likened a decision not to enforce to a prosecutor’s decision not to
indict, recognizing a “special province of the Executive Branch” by
46
virtue of the Take Care Clause of the Constitution.
In Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory
47
Commission, Baltimore Gas sued the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) over its decision to settle a regulatory matter
48
49
under the Natural Gas Act with Columbia Gas. The D.C. Circuit
50
read Chaney as based in the separation-of-powers doctrine. The
court held that the power to enforce (or not enforce) the law is vested
only in the executive branch, and “[w]hen the judiciary orders an
executive agency to enforce the law it risks arrogating to itself a
51
power the Constitution commits to the executive branch.”
The central holding in both Chaney and Baltimore Gas was that a
court, acting alone, cannot compel an agency to act. A natural
extension of these holdings is their converse: an agency cannot
compel a court to act. This would seem to be especially true when an
agency seeks to invoke a central and essential power of the courts,
52
and when the relevant statute and precedent expressly contemplate
judicial independence. Otherwise, courts would be relegated to the
role of a rubber stamper, regardless of the verbiage in which the
decision is swaddled.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 832.
46. Chaney, 470 U.S. at 832. The Take Care Clause refers to the Executive’s duty to “take
care that the laws be faithfully executed.” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
47. Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. FERC, 252 F.3d 456 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
48. Natural Gas Act, Pub. L. No. 75-688, 52 Stat. 821 (1938) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 717–717w (2012)).
49. Balt. Gas & Elec. Co., 252 F.3d at 457.
50. See id. at 459 (“Indeed, [Chaney’s] recognition that the courts must not require
agencies to initiate enforcement actions may well be a requirement of the separation of powers
commanded by our Constitution.”).
51. Id.
52. See infra note 61 (discussing the relevant language in the Securities Act of 1933); see
also infra Part III.B (providing the relevant language).
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The doctrine of separation of powers has specific application
within the context of statutory injunctions. Although courts might not
refer to the doctrine by name, the opinions and holdings evince a
concerted effort to prevent the usurpation of injunctive powers by the
53
executive branch.
B. Separation of Powers in the Context of Statutory Injunctions
An early, and still controlling, case on whether agencies are
entitled to injunctions as a matter of right under a statute authorizing
54
injunctive relief is Hecht Co. v. Bowles. In that case, the Price
Administrator of the Office of Price Administration was seeking to
55
enforce section 205(a) of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942,
56
which established maximum prices for certain goods. The Act stated
that “upon a showing by the Administrator that such a person has
engaged or is about to engage in any such acts or practices a
permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order, or other order
57
shall be granted without bond.” It was undisputed that Hecht, a
large department store, had violated the substantive provisions of the
58
Act. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether an injunction
was mandatory upon proof of a violation of the Act, as the appellate
59
court below held.
The Administrator urged that he was entitled to injunctive relief
60
as a matter of right, per the Act’s plain language. In support of this
position, the Administrator distinguished the language of the Act
from that of other statutes, including the Securities Act of 1933 (1933
Act) and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act) at issue in
61
Citigroup, which he claimed left room for judicial discretion. The

53. Cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, supra note 21, at 103 (James Madison) (“Were [the power
of the judiciary] joined to the executive power, THE JUDGE might behave with all the violence
of AN OPPRESSOR.”).
54. Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321 (1944).
55. Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-421, 56 Stat. 23.
56. Hecht Co., 321 U.S. at 321–22.
57. Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 § 205(a), 56 Stat. at 33.
58. Hecht Co., 321 U.S. at 324 (“There is no substantial controversy over the facts. . . . In its
answer petitioner pleaded among other things that any failure or neglect to comply with the
regulation was involuntary and was corrected as soon as discovered.”).
59. Id. at 322.
60. See id. at 326 (“Respondent insists that the mandatory character of § 205(a) is clear
from its language, history and purpose.”).
61. Id. at 327. Compare Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 § 205(a), 50 U.S.C. App.
§ 925(a) (1946) (stating that upon a showing of a violation, an injunction shall issue), with
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Administrator urged the Court to adopt a simple, logical construction
of the statute: if a violation is proven, then an injunction will issue.
The Administrator argued that this construction differed from that of
other statutorily authorized injunctions which included phrases like
“upon a proper showing,” or “for cause shown,” that imply a more
62
discretionary role for courts.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court disagreed with the
63
Administrator. As an initial matter, the Court did not accept that the
64
plain language of the Act mandated the issuance of an injunction.
The Court said that the language in the Act was a grant of jurisdiction
65
to the courts to issue injunctions, not a command to do so. At the
heart of the Court’s opinion was the history of equity practice and
courts’ traditionally wide latitude to craft equitable orders with
66
respect to the individual circumstances of each case. The Court
continued, “The essence of equity jurisdiction has been the power of
the Chancellor to do equity and to mold each decree to the necessities
67
of the particular case.” Moreover, injunctions have always been
68
intended to deter future conduct, not to punish past conduct. If
Congress had intended such a drastic break from tradition, the Court
held, it would have made that intent clear through explicit language in
69
the statute. Thus, the Court resolved the ambiguity “in accordance
with . . . traditional practices, as conditioned by the necessities of the
70
public interest.” The Hecht Court was careful to impress, however,
71
that courts should not grant injunctive relief “grudgingly.” When an
agency seeks approval of a consent decree, the propriety of injunctive

Securities Act of 1933 § 20(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) (2012) (stating that an injunction will issue
only upon “a proper showing” that the law has been or likely will be broken, thus implicating a
significant role for the judge who must determine if a proper showing has been made).
62. Hecht Co., 321 U.S. at 327.
63. Id. at 328.
64. Id. (“We cannot say that [the court] lacks the power to make that choice. Thus it seems
that § 205(a) falls short of making mandatory the issuance of an injunction merely because the
Administrator asks it.”).
65. Id. at 329.
66. Id.
67. Id. (emphasis added).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 330.
70. Id.
71. Id. The Court pointed out that executive agencies and Article III courts are two tools
that are meant to give effect, “through co-ordinated action,” to the aims of Congress, and that
courts must exercise their discretion consistent with the underlying purposes of the Act. Id.
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relief is dictated by concerns of the public interest, not the private
72
concerns of the litigants.
73
In Yakus v. United States, the Supreme Court again confronted
74
the issue of injunctions under the Emergency Price Control Act. The
Court reiterated that the award of an injunction “has never been
75
regarded as strictly a matter of right,” but rather as a matter of
76
“sound judicial discretion.” The Court held that when injunctive
relief would adversely affect the public interest it may rightly be
77
withheld, even if such a decision causes injury to the moving party.
In closing, the Court impressed that, “[c]ourts of equity may, and
frequently do, go much further both to give and withhold relief in
furtherance of the public interest than they are accustomed to go
78
when only private interests are involved.”
C. Factors Informing Principles of Traditional Equity
Whereas Hecht and Yakus provide valuable insight into the
scope of a court’s equitable powers, the following cases are
illustrative of the factors that inform a court’s decision regarding the
79
propriety of injunctive relief. In SEC v. Culpepper, the SEC sought
to enjoin the defendant from further offerings of unregistered stock,
despite the fact that the defendant had ceased dealing in the
80
unregistered stock prior to the SEC’s action. The Second Circuit
81
held that the cessation of the illegal activities was immaterial, but
that the burden is on the moving party to show “some cognizable
danger of recurrent violation” due to the prospective nature of
72. Id. at 331 (“For the standards of the public interest, not the requirements of private
litigation, measure the propriety and need for injunctive relief in these cases.”).
73. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944).
74. Id. at 418. Petitioners were convicted in the trial court of selling cuts of meat at prices
above the statutory ceiling. Id. The Emergency Price Control Act established an administrative
method by which regulations promulgated under the Act could be challenged. Id. Included was
a provision that disallowed any interlocutory injunctive relief, meaning that a regulation would
remain in force until there was a full adjudication of the claim. Id. The petitioners claimed that
the statutory preclusion of interlocutory injunctive relief violated their right to due process. Id.
The Court disagreed, holding that Congress could permissibly choose to protect the public from
wartime inflation by precluding interlocutory relief. Id. at 27–28.
75. Id. at 440.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 441 (quoting Virginian Ry. Co. v. Sys. Fed’n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 552 (1937)).
79. SEC v. Culpepper, 270 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1959).
80. Id. at 245.
81. Id. at 250–51.
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82

injunctions. In assessing the showing by the moving party, “[t]he
chancellor’s decision is based on all the circumstances; his discretion
is necessarily broad and a strong showing of abuse must be made to
83
reverse it.”
84
Later, in SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, the Second Circuit
considered a number of factors in assessing the propriety of an
85
injunction granted below. Generally, the court instructed that, “in
deciding whether to grant injunctive relief, a district court is called
upon to assess all those considerations of fairness that have been the
86
traditional concern of equity courts.” The district court in Manor
Nursing granted ancillary relief in the form of disgorgement of
87
profits. The appellants challenged this sanction on the grounds that
disgorgement of profits, unlike an injunction, was not explicitly
88
authorized under the 1933 and 1934 Acts. The panel held that courts
have “general equity powers” under the 1933 and 1934 Acts,
however, and that “[o]nce the equity jurisdiction of the district court
has been properly invoked by a showing of a securities-law violation,
the court possesses the necessary power to fashion an appropriate
89
remedy.” Such wide-ranging judicial discretion was thus typical in
the Second Circuit at one time.
90
Eight years later, in SEC v. Bonastia, the Third Circuit
announced a list of factors that courts should consider when weighing
91
whether to grant injunctive relief. The Third Circuit held that the
court’s determination should ultimately be guided by whether future

82. Id. at 250 (quoting United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953)).
83. Id.
84. SEC v. Manor Nursing Ctrs., Inc., 458 F.2d 1082 (2d Cir. 1972). The case involved
violations of the antifraud provision of the Securities Act of 1933. Id. at 1088.
85. See id. at 1100–01 (considering the likelihood of future violations based on past
violations, the egregiousness of past violations, the degree of remorse, and assurances of future
compliance).
86. Id. at 1102.
87. Id. at 1103.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. SEC v. Bonastia, 614 F.2d 908 (3d Cir. 1980).
91. See id. at 912–13 (“[A]mong other things, the degree of scienter involved on the part of
the defendant, the isolated or recurrent nature of the infraction, the defendant’s recognition of
the wrongful nature of his conduct, the sincerity of his assurances against future violations, and
the likelihood . . . that future violations might occur.”). The Third Circuit reversed the district
court, stating that the district court’s myopic view on only one factor, whether the defendant still
dealt in securities, was an abuse of its discretion. Id.
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violations were likely based on the totality of the circumstances. The
court determined that the repeated violations committed with
scienter weighed heavily in favor of an injunction, regardless of the
93
petitioner’s current occupation. The multifactor framework has been
94
applied in other circuits as well. The Bonastia panel closed by
stating, “When a district court refuses to apply well-settled legal
precepts to a conceded set of facts, it acts outside its allowable
95
discretion.”
96
In In re Tutu Water Wells CERCLA Litigation, the Third
Circuit cautioned that before approving a consent judgment under
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
97
Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), a reviewing judge must adjudge
both the procedural and substantive propriety of the consent
98
agreement.
99
In Mitchell v. Hodges Contracting Co., the Secretary of Labor
sought an injunction authorized by statute against a construction firm
100
for violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act. The Fifth Circuit
101
held that statutory injunctions do not issue as a matter of right.
92. Id.
93. See id. at 913 (“[H]ere we have a situation in which the repetitiveness of the violations
weighs heavily in favor of the imposition of an injunction. Furthermore . . . [the defendant]
acted with scienter of the violations. That scienter was clearly established underscores the
propriety of injunctive relief . . . .” (citations omitted)).
94. See SEC v. Youmans, 729 F.2d 413, 415 (6th Cir. 1984) (considering, in addition to the
Bonastia factors, “the egregiousness of the violation,” and “the defendant’s age and health”);
SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325, 1334 (5th Cir. 1978) (“The trial court should consider several
factors in deciding whether to issue an injunction in light of past violations. The critical question
in issuing the injunction and also the ultimate test on review is whether defendant's past conduct
indicates that there is a reasonable likelihood of further violations in the future.”).
95. Blatt, 583 F.2d at 1334.
96. In re Tutu Water Wells CERCLA Litig., 326 F.3d 201 (3d Cir. 2003).
97. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2012).
98. See In re Tutu Water Wells CERCLA Litig., 326 F.3d at 208 (describing the substantive
inquiry as ensuring that the settlement reflects comparative fault); see also United States v.
George A. Whiting Paper Co., 644 F.3d 368, 372 (7th Cir. 2011) (stating that consent judgment
should be approved if consistent with CERCLA, and is substantively and procedurally fair).
Although a distinction might be made between CERCLA and the securities laws, in Tutu Water
Wells, substantive consideration was a judge-made requirement. How do we reconcile
substantive judicial scrutiny where the EPA is concerned and not the SEC?
99. Mitchell v. Hodges Contracting Co., 238 F.2d 380 (5th Cir. 1956).
100. See id. at 381 (alleging that the contractor violated work-hour, pay, and recordkeeping
provisions of the Act). Despite finding the defendant guilty of the violations, the court
nonetheless, refused to grant an injunction. Id.
101. Id.
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Rather, the decision of whether to issue an injunction and the
injunction’s terms “must inevitably be left to the sound discretion of
102
the judge.” The judge’s discretion should be informed by, inter alia,
the sincerity and candor of the defendant: when these factors have
been properly evaluated, the decision of the district judge will be left
103
undisturbed. The Fifth Circuit expanded on this analysis in Mitchell
104
105
v. Bland, under similar factual circumstances. The court held that,
even if the panel accepted the Secretary of Labor’s arguments that
the district court’s findings were erroneous, “the Court would have
been justified in either granting or denying injunctive relief under the
106
broad discretion lodged in it by accepted equitable principles.”
Judge Friendly’s opinion in SEC v. Commonwealth Chemical
107
Securities, in which he cautioned that injunctive relief can have
significant collateral consequences for firms, exemplifies judicial
108
reticence to grant such relief. Judge Friendly noted that courts had
become “more circumspect” in their acquiescence to SEC requests
for injunctions due to a recognition that injunctions were often more
than the “mild prophylactic” that they are sometimes described to
109
be. In denying an injunction against price manipulation, Judge
110
Friendly explicitly cited the SEC’s lack of factual basis.
Other courts, too, have applied the principle that an injunction
sought by the SEC can be denied for want of factual evidence. For
111
example, in United States v. Hooker Chemicals & Plastics Corp., a
district court reviewing a consent decree announced a deferential
standard of review, so long as the court was satisfied of the factual
112
underpinnings of the settlement. The defendant in Hooker was an

102. Id.
103. See id. at 381–82 (describing the trial judge as the best witness of the parties’
demeanors and stating, “[w]here these have been properly evaluated, the action of the Trial
Court, whether granting or denying an injunction, will be sustained”).
104. Mitchell v. Bland, 241 F.2d 808 (5th Cir. 1957).
105. See id. at 809. There, the Secretary of Labor was seeking an injunction for violations of
the Fair Labor Standards Act. Id. The district court refused to issue an injunction. Id.
106. Id. at 809–10.
107. SEC v. Commonwealth Chem. Sec., Inc., 574 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1978).
108. Id. at 99.
109. Id.
110. See id. at 100 (“Since we have held the evidence was insufficient to find that Ms. Sharpe
engaged in or aided and abetted the manipulation, there is no basis for enjoining her with
respect to conduct of that sort.”).
111. United States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 540 F. Supp. 1067 (W.D.N.Y. 1982).
112. Id. at 1072–73.

EDWARDS IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1254

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

2/21/2016 10:17 PM

[Vol. 65:1241

industrial enterprise accused of disposing of 80,000 tons of toxic waste
in a landfill, creating the potential to contaminate nearby
113
waterways. The EPA sued Hooker, and soon thereafter the parties
entered into a settlement containing injunctive relief and monetary
114
damages. The court, “[r]ecognizing that the resolution of these
issues by agreement could have tremendous impact upon the
residents of the community and, indeed, upon all of the surrounding
areas,” ordered the parties to appear before the court to explain the
115
settlement provisions and answer any questions from the court. In
addition, the parties held a public hearing at a local university
regarding the settlement and held a public notice-and-comment
period for the settlement, thereby hearing and addressing concerns of
116
the general public.
After these procedures played out, the court was still
“convince[d] . . . that many questions remained unanswered and
[that] many concerns had not been addressed during the prior
hearing” and thus ordered further hearings “in an attempt to clarify
117
the highly technical and complex settlement.” After eight days of
hearings, over two thousand pages of court transcripts, and testimony
from fifteen expert witnesses, the court was satisfied that the record
118
was “complete [and] fully developed.” Only after these protracted
factual inquiries did the court agree to pass judgment on the
settlement.
In its assessment of the consent decree, the court in Hooker first
119
recognized a “clear policy in favor of encouraging settlements.” The
role of the reviewing court was to “assure itself that the terms of the
decree are fair and adequate and are not unlawful, unreasonable, or
120
against public policy.” Further, a court has a “limited duty to
inquire into the technical terms and factual disputes underlying the
121
proposed settlement.” In its assessment, a court may consider the

113. Id. at 1070.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1071.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1071–72.
119. Id. at 1072 (quoting Patterson v. Newspaper & Mail Deliverers’ Union, 514 F.2d 767,
771 (2d Cir. 1975)).
120. Id.
121. Id.
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122

the good-faith efforts of
strength of the plaintiff’s case,
123
124
negotiators, risks of litigation, and whether the putative decree is
125
in line with statutory objectives.
Not only are facts important to understanding the substantive
terms of the consent decree as exemplified by Hooker, but facts also
determine the degree of deference a judge should show an agency
126
seeking injunctive relief. In FTC v. Standard Financial Management
127
128
Corp., judicial independence was of paramount importance. The
court cautioned against “judicial inertia,” and determined that the
measure of deference owed to an agency “depends on the persuasive
power of the agency’s proposal and rationale, given whatever
practical considerations may impinge and the full panoply of the
129
attendant circumstances.” Moreover, “rather than blindly following
the agency’s lead, [a court] must make its own inquiry into the issue
130
of reasonableness before entering judgment.” The notion that the
degree of deference is to be determined by the strength of the
131
plaintiff’s claims has found traction in other circuits as well. Indeed,
132
in EEOC v. Hiram Walker & Sons, Inc., the Seventh Circuit
declared this to be the most important factor in the decision on a
133
consent judgment. In this light, Judge Rakoff’s decision in Citigroup
was far from an abuse of discretion, and instead wholly within the
mainstream. To Judge Rakoff, the SEC’s case—unsupported by any
factual stipulations—was weak, and thus the SEC was given relatively
little deference.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1073.
126. See FTC v. Standard Fin. Mgmt. Corp., 830 F.2d 404, 408 (1st Cir. 1987) (measuring the
amount of deference by the strength of the government’s case).
127. FTC v. Standard Fin. Mgmt. Corp., 830 F.2d 404 (1st Cir. 1987).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. See Flinn v. FMC Corp., 528 F.2d 1169, 1172 (4th Cir. 1975) (“The most important
factor to be considered in determining whether there has been such a clear abuse of discretion is
whether the trial court gave proper consideration to the strength of the plaintiffs’ claims on the
merits[.]”); see also United States v. Oregon, 913 F.2d 576, 580–81 (9th Cir. 1990) (discussing the
standard of review for consent decrees); Walsh v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., Inc., 726 F.2d 956,
965 (3d Cir. 1983) (stating that the most important determination in reviewing a class-action
settlement was whether it was likely the underlying legal claims could be proven).
132. EEOC v. Hiram Walker & Sons, Inc., 768 F.2d 884 (7th Cir. 1985).
133. Id. at 889.
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Judicial independence is pervasive whenever consent judgments
134
are sought. In the antitrust context, FTC v. Weyerhaeuser Co. is
illustrative. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) sought a
preliminary injunction to block a merger it alleged violated antitrust
135
laws. After acknowledging that the court owed a degree of
deference to the FTC, the D.C. Circuit maintained that a “judge
remains obligated to exercise independent judgment on the propriety
of issuance of a temporary restraining order or preliminary
injunction. A court does not exercise independent judgment when it
responds automatically to the agency’s threshold showings. To
exercise such judgment, the court must take genuine account of ‘the
136
equities.’”
137
In eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C. the Supreme Court
138
underscored the importance of the fundamental principles of equity.
Justice Thomas, writing for the majority, stated that the traditional
considerations of equity must be considered when injunctive relief is
sought and that no general rule or formula may govern its
139
application. Upon suing eBay for patent infringement and obtaining
a favorable verdict, MercExchange had sought to permanently enjoin
140
eBay from further infringement. The district court refused the
motion, stating that MercExchange fell within a broad class to which
141
injunctive relief was unavailable. Invoking a similarly broad brush
(albeit in favor of issuance), the Federal Circuit reversed and held
that a permanent injunction should always issue when a patent has
142
been determined to be both valid and infringed.
The Supreme Court, with eight justices concurring and one
143
recusal, rejected categorical rules and injunctions as of right. The

134. FTC v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 665 F.2d 1072 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
135. Id. at 1074.
136. Id. at 1082 (citation omitted).
137. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
138. See id. at 391–92 (stating that the traditional equity considerations are at play whenever
permanent injunctive relief is sought, unless Congress explicitly departs from that scheme).
139. See id. at 392–93. (“[T]raditional equitable principles do not permit such broad
classifications.”).
140. Id. at 391.
141. Id. at 393 (explaining that the district court reasoned that because MercExchange was
willing to license its patent, and was not itself pursuing the patent, a permanent injunction was
unavailable).
142. Id. at 393–94.
143. See id. at 392–93 (stating that blanket rules and principles of equity are irreconcilable).
Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, while Justices Scalia and Ginsburg joined a
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Court admonished that traditional equity principles are always in
144
In his
effect but for an express mandate from Congress.
concurrence, Chief Justice Roberts instructed that history is the
145
Although eBay concerned a permanent
lodestar of equity.
injunction under the Patent Act, Justice Thomas’s language was
146
broad and has been interpreted to apply in a variety of contexts.
The importance of history in the opinion and its concurrences leaves
little room for doubt that equitable precedent looms large and should
not lightly be set aside in the name of pragmatism or deference.
It is important to note that Congress can, and has from time to
147
time, restricted or guided the discretion of courts sitting in equity.
Because equity practice has a “background of several hundred years
148
of history,” however, this is not accomplished without an express
149
congressional mandate. The best announcement of this notion
150
comes from the Supreme Court in Porter v. Warner Holding Co.:
[T]he comprehensiveness of this equitable jurisdiction is not to be
denied or limited in the absence of a clear and valid legislative
command. Unless a statute in so many words, or by a necessary and

concurrence by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer joined a
concurrence by Justice Kennedy. Justice Alito took no part in the consideration of the case. Id.
at 388.
144. See id. at 391–92 (“As this Court has long recognized, a major departure from the long
tradition of equity practice should not be lightly implied.”).
145. Id. at 395 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (“When it comes to discerning and applying those
standards [of equity], in this area as others, ‘a page of history is worth a volume of logic.’”
(quoting N.Y. Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921))).
146. It is worth noting that Justice Thomas cited two opinions that did not concern
intellectual property. Id. at 391 (citing Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1982);
Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531 (1987)); see also Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d
68, 77–78 (2d Cir. 2010) (“[N]othing in the text or the logic of eBay suggests that its rule is
limited to patent cases. On the contrary, eBay strongly indicates that the traditional principles of
equity it employed are the presumptive standard for injunctions in any context.” (footnote
omitted)).
147. See Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944) (stating that the principles of equity
jurisdiction will not be forsaken without a clear Congressional mandate); see also Weinberger,
456 U.S. at 313–14 (“Of course, Congress may intervene and guide or control the exercise of the
courts’ discretion, but we do not lightly assume that Congress has intended to depart from
established principles.”).
148. Hecht Co., 321 U.S. at 329.
149. See id. at 330 (“We do not believe that such a major departure from that long tradition
as is here proposed should be lightly implied.”).
150. Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395 (1946).
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inescapable inference, restricts the court’s jurisdiction in equity, the
151
full scope of that jurisdiction is to be recognized and applied.

As demonstrated, equitable practice with regard to statutory
injunctions has a rich and long history, a history which was largely
ignored by the Second Circuit in Citigroup. The Second Circuit
ignored the requirement of a “conceded set of facts,” on which to
apply “well-settled legal precepts,” which is precisely what Judge
152
Rakoff sought. Judge Rakoff’s attempts to evaluate the substantive
propriety of the settlement were frustrated by the granting of the
153
power to determine the public interest to the SEC. The Citigroup
holding is antipodean to the proposition in Commonwealth Chemical
Securities, that an injunction sought by the SEC can be denied for
154
want of factual evidence. Finally, the rule of the Second Circuit, that
reviewing courts should generally be satisfied by the SEC’s mere
averments, stands in stark contrast to the notion of independent
155
judgment as described by the D.C. Circuit in FTC v. Weyerhaeuser.
The next Part develops these criticisms more formally and argues that
Citigroup was wrongly decided.
II. SEC SETTLEMENT PRACTICES AND THE DECISIONS IN
CITIGROUP
SEC v. Citigroup Global Markets did not occur in a vacuum. A
proper understanding of events and circumstances that preceded the
suit is critical to a full understanding of the opinion. Although a full
treatment of the 2008 global financial crisis is beyond the scope of this
Note, two crisis-related topics are explored below: the SEC’s use of

151. Id. at 398; see also Brown v. Swann, 35 U.S. 497, 503 (1836) (“The great principles of
equity, securing complete justice, should not be yielded to light inferences, or doubtful
construction.”).
152. See SEC v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc. (Citigroup I), 827 F. Supp. 2d 328, 333 (S.D.N.Y.
2011) (discussing lack of factual basis as the “fundamental[]” reason for denying the consent
judgment).
153. See In re Tutu Water Wells CERCLA Litig., 326 F.3d 201, 206 (3d Cir. 2003)
(explaining that consent decrees further the public interest if they promote efficient remediation
of hazardous waste).
154. See SEC v. Commonwealth Chem. Sec., Inc., 574 F.2d 90, 100 (2d Cir. 1978) (“Since we
have held the evidence was insufficient to find that [the defendant] engaged in or aided and
abetted the manipulation, there is no basis for enjoining her with respect to conduct of that
sort.”).
155. See FTC v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 665 F.2d 1072, 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (“Independent
judgment is not exercised when a court responds automatically to the agency's threshold
showings. To exercise such judgment, the court must take genuine account of the equities.”).
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“neither-admit-nor-deny” settlements and the facts underlying
Citigroup. After that, Section C discusses in depth the Second
Circuit’s opinion.
156

A. “Hallowed by History, but Not by Reason” : The SEC’s Use of
Neither-Admit-Nor-Deny Settlements
The SEC is the principal securities-market conduct regulator in
157
the United States. In fulfilling its mandate, the SEC has a large
158
toolbox of enforcement mechanisms. Generally speaking, the SEC
may bring a civil action in federal court or an administrative action
159
before an administrative law judge. Irrespective of the forum in
which an action is initiated, over 90 percent of SEC actions are
160
resolved via settlement. Commonly, these settlements allow a
161
defendant to “neither admit nor deny” wrongdoing. Neither-admitnor-deny settlements allow a defendant to settle an action without
having to admit any wrongdoing, while at the same time barring that
162
defendant from denying having engaged in unlawful conduct.
Neither-admit-nor-deny settlements, although not the only

156. Citigroup I, 827 F. Supp. at 332 (“[T]he S.E.C.’s long-standing policy—hallowed by
history, but not by reason—of allowing defendants to enter into Consent Judgments without
admitting or denying the underlying allegations, deprives the Court of even the most minimal
assurance that the substantial injunctive relief it is being asked to impose has any basis in fact.”
(footnote omitted)).
157. See generally James R. Doty, The Role of the Securities and Exchange Commission in
an Internationalized Marketplace, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. S77 (1992) (discussing the development
of the role of the SEC).
158. See Danné L. Johnson, SEC Settlement: Agency Self-Interest or Public Interest, 12
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 627, 645 (2007) (discussing the remedies available to the SEC that
do not require judicial approval, including cease-and-desist orders, suspension/revocation of
SEC registration, censure, bars from future association broker-dealer or investment adviser,
pecuniary fines, and disgorgement, among others).
159. Id. at 645–46.
160. See SEC v. Clifton, 700 F.2d 744, 748 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (providing the 90-percent figure);
Samuel W. Buell, Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Civil Liability, in PROSECUTORS IN
THE BOARDROOM: USING CRIMINAL LAW TO REGULATE CORPORATE CONDUCT 87, 92
(Anthony S. Barkow & Rachel E. Barkow eds., 2011) (“The SEC also settles almost all its
enforcement actions.”). At least one source has the figure as high as 98 percent. Priyah Kaul,
Admit or Deny: A Call for Reform of the SEC’s “Neither-Admit-Nor-Deny” Policy, 48 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 535, 536 (2015).
161. Examining the Settlement Practices of U.S. Financial Regulators: Hearing Before the H.
Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. 77 (2012) [hereinafter Khuzami] (statement of Robert
Khuzami, Director of the Division of Enforcement, Securities and Exchange Commission).
162. Johnson, supra note 158, at 647.
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163

enforcement tool available to the SEC, are commonly used by the
164
SEC.
The SEC justifies its widespread use of neither-admit-nor-deny
settlements on the grounds that they are more efficient than litigation
in terms of time and cost for both the SEC and, generally, the
165
defendant. These settlements are further justified on the grounds
that requiring a firm to admit to unlawful conduct could prevent the
firm from denying such conduct in later actions, thus exposing the
firm to an unknown amount of future damages in an unknown
166
number of future actions. Firms would thus be incentivized to
litigate, and fewer enforcement actions would be brought overall due
to resource constraints. Courts have generally approved such
settlements in a wide variety of contexts, not limited to securities
167
violations.
The practice of allowing neither-admit-nor-deny settlements is
168
not without its critics, however. Some observers lament that this
169
More
enforcement mechanism lacks potency and credibility.
damning is the criticism that the SEC is more concerned with fanfare

163. Since 2011, the SEC has made much use of Deferred Prosecution Agreements (DPAs),
in which the SEC agrees to withhold prosecution in exchange for certain concessions, usually
including the cessation of the activities giving rise to the action. DPAs do not require approval
or adjudication by a court. See Press Release, SEC, Tenaris to Pay $5.4 Million in SEC’s FirstEver Deferred Prosecution Agreement (May 17, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/
2011-112.htm [http://perma.cc/E3NJ-UD7D].
164. See Buell, supra note 160, at 89 ( “[T]he ‘neither admit nor deny’ settlement is a fixture
in SEC practice.”).
165. See Khuzami, supra note 161, at 79 (statement of Robert Khuzami) (stating that full
adjudications in every case would lead to fewer enforcement actions).
166. See id. (“The reality is that many companies likely would refuse to settle cases if they
were required to affirmatively admit unlawful conduct or facts related to that conduct.”); see
also James B. Stewart, The S.E.C. Has a Message for Firms Not Used to Admitting Guilt, N.Y.
TIMES, June 22, 2013, at B6 (“If they admit culpability to the S.E.C., plaintiffs will cite that in
their cases, and that could mean hundred[s] of millions or billions in damages . . . .”).
167. Khuzami, supra note 161, at 80–81 (statement of Robert Khuzami) (“In enforcing the
securities, antitrust, environmental, consumer protection, public health, and civil rights laws,
federal courts have entered consent judgments in actions resolved by federal agencies . . . .”
(footnotes omitted)).
168. See Buell, supra note 160, at 89 (“Does any of this accomplish enough, especially if this
instance of wrongdoing occurred even though this firm or peer firms were subject to these forms
of liability in the past?”).
169. See id. (“The replacement of a private citizen as plaintiff with the federal securities cop
adds some gravity to the proceedings, but the routine practice of concluding cases without any
finding or admission of wrongdoing by the firm may substantially blunt that effect.”).
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170

and press conferences than achieving just results. A fundamental
criticism of neither-admit-nor-deny settlements is that enforcement
carried out on the public’s behalf should do more than fill
171
government coffers. Professor Samuel Buell writes that “[i]t is
practically an abdication of responsibility for a public enforcer to
resolve almost all its cases with no conclusion by the legal process as
172
to whether wrongdoing occurred.”
It is worth reflecting on the impact of a settlement in which the
defendant neither admits nor denies wrongdoing on the overall
objectives of the securities laws. Investor confidence is essential to
well-functioning markets, and promoting investor confidence was one
173
impetus for the 1934 Act. Central to investor confidence is a belief
that enforcement actions will effectively deter future wrongdoing by
market participants. It is difficult to discern how the deterrence and
signaling functions of SEC enforcement are fulfilled when neitheradmit-nor-deny settlements are regarded as a mere “cost of doing
174
business.” Some on the bench have expressed misgivings about this
175
type of settlement as well. Indeed, in a suit against Bank of America
(BoA), Judge Rakoff called neither-admit-nor-deny settlements
176
“half-baked justice at best.”
170. SEC v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc. (Citigroup I), 827 F. Supp. 2d 328, 333 (S.D.N.Y.
2011) (“It is harder to discern from the limited information before the Court what the S.E.C. is
getting from this settlement other than a quick headline.”); Buell, supra note 160, at 97.
171. See Buell, supra note 160 at 99 (“Regulatory enforcement is pursued on behalf of the
public, who for good reasons would very much like to be told whether the firm is a lawbreaker
and, if so, exactly how and to what extent. The public would much prefer to learn this from an
admission or a careful adjudicatory process than from the mere allegation of it in a federal
agency’s complaint that, beyond at most a motion to dismiss, is never subject to the scrutiny of
legal process.”).
172. Id. Professor Buell later retreats from this position somewhat, but it is nonetheless
illustrative of a common criticism of neither-admit-nor-deny settlements. See id. (reflecting that
he is “being quite unfair” in his criticisms of the SEC’s practices and that “[t]he SEC’s ‘neither
admit nor deny’ practice has a good rationale”).
173. See S. REP. No. 73-1455, at 284 (1934) (discussing investor confidence as essential to
performance of markets and fluctuations in asset prices, divorced from fundamentals); see also
James D. Cox, Randall S. Thomas & Dana Kiku, SEC Enforcement Heuristics: An Empirical
Inquiry, 53 DUKE L.J. 737, 759 (2003) (describing deterrence of financial fraud as a mission of
SEC).
174. Stewart, supra note 166, at B6.
175. See, e.g., SEC v. Bank of Am. Corp., Nos. 09 Civ. 6829, 10 Civ. 0215, 2010 WL 624581,
at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2010) (granting SEC’s consent motion albeit “shaking its head” at the
SEC’s “modest and misdirected sanctions” imposed upon a defendant that “trie[d] to escape the
implications of hiding material information from its shareholders”).
176. See id. at *5 (“While better than nothing, this [settlement] is half-baked justice at
best.”).
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In SEC v. Bank of America Corp., the SEC alleged that BoA
178
lied to its shareholders in a proxy statement. In order to achieve
approval of BoA’s $50 billion acquisition of Merrill Lynch (Merrill),
BoA’s proxy statement disclosed that Merrill had agreed to withhold
179
executive bonuses in the period prior to the closing of the deal.
After closing, it came to light that Merrill paid $5.8 billion in bonuses
180
181
to its executives. BoA made no corrective disclosure. The SEC
filed a complaint alleging that BoA “materially lied” to shareholders
182
and sought a $150 million fine. Judge Rakoff was frustrated not only
because he perceived the penalty as paltry, but also because
shareholders would be on the hook for the misdeeds of
183
management.
Judge Rakoff initially refused to approve the consent decree for
want of factual support. Only after multiple supplemental Statements
of Fact and “hundreds of pages of deposition testimony and other
184
evidentiary materials” did Judge Rakoff reluctantly approve the
185
settlement. Bank of America can thus be seen as foreshadowing
Citigroup.
B. Factual and Procedural History of SEC v. Citigroup Global
Markets
The story of Citigroup’s ascension to the Second Circuit reads
like a Shakespearean drama: proceeding in different acts, with
unlikely alliances, and the ultimate downfall of the protagonist in the
186
final act. It is in fair New York, “where we lay our scene.”

177. SEC v. Bank of Am. Corp., Nos. 09 Civ. 6829, 10 Civ. 0215, 2010 WL 624581 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 22, 2010).
178. See id. at *1 (finding that the proxy statement “failed to adequately disclose” details
about bonus payments).
179. See id. (“[A] prudent Bank shareholder, if informed of the aforementioned facts, would
have thought twice about approving the merger . . . .”).
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. SEC v. Bank of Am. Corp., 653 F. Supp. 2d 507, 508 (S.D.N.Y. 2009),
183. See id. (“This proposal to have the victims of the violation pay an additional penalty for
their own victimization was enough to give the Court pause.”).
184. Bank of Am. Corp., 2010 WL 624581, at *1.
185. See id. at *5 (“While better than nothing, this [settlement] is half-baked justice at
best.”).
186. See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO & JULIET act 1, prologue (Cambridge ed.,
University Press 1955) (“In fair Verona, where we lay our scene . . . .”).
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In October 2011, the SEC filed a suit against Citi alleging “a
187
serious securities fraud.” According to the SEC’s complaint, Citi
created a billion-dollar fund in the nascent stages of the subprime
mortgage crisis that it filled with negatively forecasted assets in an
188
attempt to rid itself of that exposure. In marketing this fund to
investors, Citi claimed that the constituent assets were selected by an
independent investment adviser, when in fact the assets were selected
189
by Citi itself. Citi then took short positions in the same assets that
190
were included in the Fund. The Fund netted Citi $160 million in
191
profits while investors lost more than $700 million.
Although the SEC’s complaint alleged the elements of fraud, the
192
SEC, “for reasons of its own,” charged Citi only with negligence.
The SEC alleged that Citi knew it would have had trouble selling the
Fund to investors if they had known that the Fund was being used as
193
a vehicle for Citi to unload (and short) its poorly projected assets.
In a simultaneous filing, the SEC sought the court’s approval of a
pre-negotiated consent judgment with Citi, including a neither-admit194
nor-deny clause.
The consent judgment had three primary
provisions. First, it sought to “permanently restrain[] and enjoin[]”
Citi from future violations of the same kind. Second, it called for
disgorgement of $160 million in profits, plus $30 million in interest,
and an additional $95 million civil penalty. And, third, it called for
changes to certain internal controls of Citi for a period of three
195
years.
Even in light of agency deference, the district court concluded
196
that it could not approve the consent judgment. The court ruled that
before it can invoke its injunctive powers, it must be satisfied that the
proposed settlement “is fair, reasonable, adequate, and in the public
197
interest.” The court determined that the putative settlement met

187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
2011).
196.
197.

SEC v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc. (Citigroup IV), 752 F.3d 285, 289 (2d Cir. 2014).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 297.
Id. at 289.
Id.
SEC v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc. (Citigroup I), 827 F. Supp. 2d 328, 332 (S.D.N.Y.
Id. at 335.
Id. at 330 (citations omitted). The court continued,
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198

none of those requirements. The court also cited the public’s
interest in knowing the truth, as well as the fear of courts becoming
199
“mere handmaiden[s]” of government agencies. In this regard it is
critical that Judge Rakoff refused the decree not because he required
an admission of liability, but because he was provided no facts by
200
which to assess the settlement.
In particular, Judge Rakoff was curious how the settlement
amounts were reached and, relatedly, why Citi’s settlement was
substantially less than an SEC settlement with Goldman Sachs when
the two firms engaged in similar conduct but Goldman’s was less
201
severe. Moreover, he wanted to know why important terms and
remedial measures contained in Goldman’s settlement were not
included in Citigroup’s, despite Goldman’s cooperation with the
202
investigation and Citigroup’s failure to cooperate. Earlier in the
proceedings, Judge Rakoff submitted other questions to the litigants,
including inquiries into how the SEC ensures compliance with
injunctions and how many contempt proceedings it has brought to
203
204
enforce such injunctions against large banks. The answer was zero.
Judge Rakoff further faulted the SEC’s policy of settling actions
without requiring defendants to admit or deny the underlying
allegations as “depriv[ing] the Court of even the most minimal
assurance that the substantial injunctive relief it is being asked to

[I]t is clear that before a court may employ its injunctive and contempt powers in
support of an administrative settlement, it is required, even after giving substantial
deference to the views of the administrative agency, to be satisfied that it is not being
used as a tool to enforce an agreement that is unfair, unreasonable, inadequate, or in
contravention of the public interest.
Id. at 332.
198. Id. at 332.
199. In full, the court stated,
[W]hen a public agency asks a court to become its partner in enforcement by
imposing wide-ranging injunctive remedies on a defendant, enforced by the
formidable judicial power of contempt, the court, and the public, need some
knowledge of what the underlying facts are: for otherwise, the court becomes a mere
handmaiden to a settlement privately negotiated on the basis on unknown facts, while
the public is deprived of ever knowing the truth in a matter of obvious public
importance.
Id.
200. See Coffee, supra note 17, at 2 (“[The court’s] protest is that it has no information
about the strength of the case is hardly the same as demanding that the defendant stipulate to
the allegations in the SEC’s complaint.”).
201. Citigroup I, 827 F. Supp. 2d at 334–35 n.7.
202. Id.
203. SEC v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc. (Citigroup IV), 752 F.3d 285, 289–90 (2d Cir. 2014).
204. Coffee, supra note 17, at 3.
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205

Additionally, he expressed
impose has any basis in fact.”
displeasure with the fact that settlements of this type are most
206
frequently viewed as a mere cost of doing business.
As the public interest was concerned, Judge Rakoff cautioned
that the “successful resolution of [the parties’] competing interests
207
cannot be automatically equated with the public interest.” In
particular, the court was concerned not only that Citi got a sweet
208
deal, but also that defrauded investors would be disadvantaged in
two related ways should they seek to recoup their losses through
209
private litigation. Not only are private litigants prevented from
bringing securities claims based on negligence, but the neither-admitnor-deny settlement deprived investors of any collateral estoppel
210
assistance.
In his concluding remarks, Judge Rakoff cautioned against
211
judicial action not based in fact, calling it “inherently dangerous,”
and noted that when injunctive power is not based on facts “it serves
212
no lawful or moral purpose and is simply an engine of oppression.”
Judge Rakoff then refused to enter the settlement and proceeded to
213
set a date for trial. Both the SEC and Citi took interlocutory
appeals and filed for a stay of proceedings pending the results of
214
those appeals.
215
Judge Rakoff denied the parties’ motions to stay.
Unbeknownst to the district court, however, the SEC had filed an
“emergency motion” in the Second Circuit seeking a stay pending the
outcome of its interlocutory appeal or, alternatively, a temporary

205. Citigroup I, 827 F. Supp. 2d at 332.
206. See id. at 333 (“As for common experience, a consent judgment that does not involve
any admissions and that results in only very modest penalties is just as frequently viewed,
particularly in the business community, as a cost of doing business . . . . This, indeed, is
Citigroup’s position in this very case.”).
207. Id. at 335.
208. See id. at 333 (“If the allegations of the Complaint are true, this is a very good deal for
Citigroup; and, even if they are untrue, it is a mild and modest cost of doing business.”); see also
id. at 334 (describing the $95 million fine as “pocket change” to Citi).
209. See id. at 334 (describing how investors were dealt a “double blow”).
210. Id.
211. Id. at 335.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. SEC v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts. Inc. (Citigroup II), 827 F. Supp. 2d 336, 336–37 (S.D.N.Y.
2011).
215. Id. at 340.
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216

stay. In an amazing (if serendipitous) feat of judicial timing, the
Second Circuit granted the SEC’s motion for a temporary stay in a
217
terse per curiam opinion just one minute before the district court
218
published its opinion denying the parties’ motion to stay.
C. Fixing the Menu: The Second Circuit’s Decision
219

After a fair amount of procedural skirmishing, the Second
Circuit ultimately held that Judge Rakoff’s refusal to accept the
220
settlement between the SEC and Citi was an abuse of discretion.
The court’s analysis consisted of three distinct issues: the appellate
court’s jurisdiction to hear the appeal, the propriety of a consent
decree being conditioned on an admission of liability, and the level of
221
deference owed to the SEC. Consistent with the Second Circuit’s
analysis, the analysis here will focus mainly on the third question.
1. Did the Second Circuit Have Jurisdiction to Hear the Appeal?
The panel first considered whether it had jurisdiction to hear the
interlocutory appeal. The Final Judgment Rule generally limits
appeals to final dispositions, so as to avoid protracted litigation and
222
piecemeal review of litigation. But the Final Judgment Rule is not
223
without exceptions. When lower courts issue interlocutory orders

216. See id. (explaining that the SEC filed an emergency motion without notification to the
court and was “seeking a stay pending appeal or, in the alternative, a temporary stay, and
representing that the motion was unopposed by Citigroup”).
217. SEC v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts. Inc., Nos. 11-5227(L), 11-5242(XAP), 2011 WL 6937373,
at *1 (2d Cir. Dec. 27, 2011).
218. See Citigroup II, 827 F. Supp. 2d at 341 (providing procedural posture).
219. Because both the SEC and Citi argued for the stay, the motions panel considered only
briefs from one side of the dispute. Citigroup III, 673 F.3d 158, 161 (2d Cir. 2012). Perhaps
unsurprisingly, the three-judge panel granted the stay. Id. at 169. First, the panel stated that
Judge Rakoff gave too little deference to the SEC’s determination of what constituted serving
the public interest. Id. at 163. Addressing next the district court’s assertion that the grant of
substantial relief on the basis of allegations was unfair to Citi, the panel held that it is not within
a court’s purview to protect “private, sophisticated, counseled” parties from settlements to
which they agree. Id. at 165. Finally, the panel rejected the notion that a court can refuse a
settlement on the grounds that the settlement does not prove or concede liability. Id. at 166.
220. See SEC v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc. (Citigroup IV), 752 F.3d 285, 291 (2d Cir. 2014)
(“A district court abuses its discretion if it ‘(1) based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law,’
(2) ‘made a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence,’ or (3) ‘rendered a decision that
cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions.’” (quoting Lynch v. City of New
York, 589 F.3d 94, 99 (2d Cir. 2009))).
221. Id. at 291, 293.
222. Id. at 292.
223. Id.
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affecting the status of injunctive relief, and such orders are said to
have serious or irreparable consequences, interlocutory appeals may
224
be allowed. When the denial of a settlement is, in effect, the denial
of injunctive relief, and if the denial will result in irreparable harm if
225
left undisturbed, a party is entitled to an interlocutory appeal. The
226
Second Circuit found that this standard was satisfied. First, because
the consent decree included two types of injunctive relief (a pro
forma “obey-the-law” injunction, and implementation of certain
internal-compliance controls), the denial of the consent decree did
227
deny the SEC the injunctive relief it sought. Second, the SEC
demonstrated irreparable harm because, in the eyes of the appellate
court, the district court “expressed no willingness to revisit the
settlement agreement with the parties, [and] instead [set] a trial
228
date.” Thus, the Second Circuit concluded that it had jurisdiction to
229
hear the appeal.
2. Did Judge Rakoff Require an Admission of Liability? The
appeals panel disposed of the second issue in a single paragraph. The
SEC argued that Judge Rakoff abused his discretion by conditioning
230
the approval of the consent decree on Citi’s admission of liability.
As the district court’s pro bono counsel submitted, however, Judge
231
Rakoff did not condition liability on an admission. The panel
accepted the position of the district court’s counsel, “[w]ith good
reason—there is no basis in the law for the district court to require an
224. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (2012) (granting appellate jurisdiction over interlocutory orders
“granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or
modify injunctions”); see Carson v. Am. Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 84 (1981) (“Unless a litigant
can show that an interlocutory order of the district court might have a serious, perhaps
irreparable, consequence, and that order can be effectually challenged only by immediate
appeal, the general congressional policy against piecemeal review will preclude interlocutory
appeal.”).
225. Citigroup IV, 752 F.3d at 293.
226. Id.
227. Id. The SEC has not enforced a single injunction against a financial institution for over
a decade. SEC v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc. (Citigroup I), 827 F. Supp. 2d 328, 334 (S.D.N.Y.
2011). This leaves one to wonder why the SEC wanted these injunctions.
228. Citigroup IV, 752 F.3d at 293.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.; see Coffee, supra note 17, at 2 (stating that Judge Rakoff conditioned approval not
on Citi’s admission of liability, but upon lack of facts). This is an important point, as many critics
of Judge Rakoff’s opinion use this straw man. A pro bono counsel was appointed to argue in
favor of Judge Rakoff’s opinion because both the SEC and Citi were in favor of approval of the
consent decree.
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admission of liability as a condition for approving a settlement
232
between the parties.”
3. How Much Deference Should Be Afforded to the SEC? The
233
degree of deference owed to the SEC was a “far thornier” issue.
The panel first laid out two related background principles: there is a
“strong federal policy” in favor of consent decrees and, at the same
234
time, courts are not “rubber stamps” to the whims of agencies. It is
235
between these two poles that the sparring took place.
The panel next set out to determine the proper standard of
review. The panel clarified that when a court reviews a consent
decree involving an enforcement agency, the court should consider
236
“whether the proposed consent decree is fair and reasonable.” And
when injunctive relief is included, the court should also ensure that
237
“the public interest would not be disserviced.” A district court is
required to enter a consent decree “[a]bsent a substantial basis” that
238
one of these elements is violated. Missing from the standard
239
announced by the court is the requirement of adequacy.
The Second Circuit defined the inquiry into the fairness and
reasonableness of a consent decree as focused on whether the decree
240
is procedurally proper. A court should also ensure that the decree is
241
not the product of collusion or corruption. Finally, the baseline

232. Citigroup IV, 752 F.3d at 293.
233. Id.
234. See id. (“Our court recognizes a strong federal policy favoring the approval and
enforcement of consent decrees. To be sure, when the district judge is presented with a
proposed consent judgment, he is not merely a rubber stamp.”).
235. Id. at 294–98.
236. Id. at 294.
237. See id. (providing that so long as an injunction is not unfair, unreasonable, or, when
injunctive relief is concerned, when that injunctive relief would not be a disservice to the public,
consent decrees must be approved).
238. Id.
239. See id. (reasoning that the adequacy standard was borrowed from settlement review in
the class action context). In such a context, an adequacy requirement makes sense because
future claims are barred via res judicata. Id. However, that is generally not the case in the
context of consent decrees. Id. Plaintiffs with private rights of action are free to bring those
claims any time, and where no private rights of action exist, “the S.E.C. is the entity charged
with representing the victims, and is politically liable if it fails to adequately perform its duties.”
Id.
240. See id. at 295 (“The primary focus of the inquiry [into fairness and reasonableness],
however, should be on ensuring the consent decree is procedurally proper . . . .”).
241. Id. at 294–95.
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legality of the decree, clarity of language, and resolution of
242
underlying claims are among the considerations.
As to factual support for consent decrees, the Second Circuit
held that requiring the SEC to establish the veracity of its allegations
was an abuse of discretion: “Trials are primarily about the truth.
243
Consent decrees are primarily about pragmatism.” The court then
engaged in a discussion of the relative merits of consent decrees in
244
mitigating risk, uncertainty, and costs associated with litigation.
Although the court did not establish any bright-line rule about how
well supported a consent decree must be, it stated that district courts
should generally be satisfied by the averments of the SEC, and that
here the district court had a “sufficient” record on which to approve
245
the consent decree. Thus in just one paragraph, the Second Circuit
246
dispatched the crux of the district court’s concern.
In considering the public interest, the court held that “[t]he job
of determining whether the proposed S.E.C. consent decree best
serves the public interest, however, rests squarely with the S.E.C., and
247
its decision merits significant deference.”
In support of this
proposition, the panel offered that federal judges have no
constituency, whereas executive agencies have a congressional
248
constituency. The panel then confronted Judge Rakoff’s publicinterest inquiry, and determined that “the district court made no
findings that the injunctive relief proposed in the consent decree
would disservice the public interest, in part because it defined the
249
public interest as ‘an overriding interest in knowing the truth.’” To
the Second Circuit, this was an improper inquiry and thus constituted
250
legal error.

242. Id.
243. See id. at 295 (“It is an abuse of discretion to require, as the district court did here, that
the S.E.C. establish the ‘truth’ of the allegations against a settling party as a condition for
approving the consent decrees.”).
244. Id.
245. See id. at 295–96 (stating that “colorable claims, supported by factual averments”
provide sufficient basis for approval of consent).
246. Id.
247. Id. at 296 (emphasis added).
248. Id. (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 866
(1984)).
249. Id. at 297 (quoting the district court’s opinion).
250. See id. (explaining that whereas a district court cannot find the public interest disserved
based on a policy disagreement with the SEC, it could, for example, find the public interest
disserved if the consent decree barred private causes of action).
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The Second Circuit went on to state that the decisions about
which causes of action to charge against particular defendants were
251
entirely within the purview of the SEC. And further, for a district
court to withhold approval of a consent decree because it did not
believe the proper charges were brought constituted an abuse of
252
discretion.
Finally, the panel pointed out that the SEC is free to carry out its
enforcement efforts through administrative channels, outside the
253
reach of Article III courts. The panel cautioned hollowly that if the
SEC seeks to invoke the equitable powers of courts, “then the S.E.C.
must be willing to assure the court that the settlement proposed is fair
254
and reasonable.” The court closed its analysis by restating the
(equally hollow) rubber-stamp motif: “For the courts to simply accept
a proposed S.E.C. consent decree without any review would be a
dereliction of the court’s duty to ensure the orders it enters are
255
proper.”
III. CONFRONTING THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S DECISION
The decision of the Second Circuit in Citigroup is flawed in at
least two respects. First, the decision patently violates the separationof-powers doctrine by granting the SEC far too much power to
determine the propriety of an injunction. Second, it ignores
longstanding precedent regarding the role of courts with respect to
equitable relief. This Part analyzes both of these objections.
A. Separation of Powers: Ceding a Central Function
In Citigroup, the Second Circuit’s holding grants to the SEC a
function central and essential to the judiciary, and thus violates the
256
separation-of-powers principle. Namely, the decision permits the
SEC to be the arbiter of the public interest: “The job of determining
251. See id. (defining the SEC’s sphere of jurisdiction).
252. Id. Again, this seems to be a straw man. It is no mistake the panel appended this phrase
with “to the extent.” See id. (“To the extent the district court withheld approval of the consent
decree on the ground that it believed the S.E.C. failed to bring the proper charges against
Citigroup, that constituted an abuse of discretion.” (emphasis added)).
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 298.
256. See Chadha v. INS, 634 F.2d 408, 425 (9th Cir. 1980) (“[W]e define a constitutional
violation of the separation of powers as an assumption by one branch of the powers that are
central or essential to the operation of a coordinate branch . . . .”).
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whether the proposed S.E.C. consent decree best serves the public
interest, however, rests squarely with the S.E.C., and its decision
257
merits significant deference.” Given that the primary consideration
in injunctive relief is consideration of the public interest, the SEC
may now decide for itself when injunctive relief is warranted.
After Citigroup, the decision to grant or deny injunctive relief is
only nominally a decision for the courts. Professor John Coffee,
writing before the decision of the Second Circuit came down,
reasoned that the only way the court of appeals could reverse Judge
Rakoff would be to declare that the SEC has the “sole discretion” to
258
determine when injunctive relief is warranted. That is precisely
what the Second Circuit held.
The decision is also disruptive to the judiciary and prevents
judges from discharging their duties, meeting the standard set out in
259
Nixon for finding a separation-of-powers violation. Article III of the
260
Constitution explicitly vests equity power in the courts. There is no
indication courts are unsatisfactory or ill-situated in this regard. On
the contrary, hundreds of years of equitable precedent provide
compelling reason to conclude that courts take this responsibility
seriously and discharge this duty to effect just and reasonable
outcomes. Citigroup, however, all but places the courts’ equity powers
with the SEC in the context of securities enforcement. Courts are thus
confined in their own use of equitable powers, resulting in the loss of
a key constitutionally granted function.
Equitable relief is precisely the sort of central and essential
power contemplated in Nixon and Chadha. Equitable relief has been
a crucial tool of the courts in a number of contexts including

257. See Citigroup IV, 752 F.3d at 296.
258. See Coffee, supra note 17, at 3. Coffee states that
[t]he only basis on which the Second Circuit could seemingly grant the requested
relief . . . would be to find that the SEC, and not the district court, has the sole
discretion to determine whether a proposed settlement is fair, reasonable, adequate
and in the public interest. To date, even though the SEC is entitled to deference, the
case law does not go anywhere near this far.
Id.
259. See Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977) (“[T]he proper inquiry
focuses on the extent to which [another branch’s act] prevents the Executive Branch from
accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions.”).
260. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (“The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law
and equity . . . .”). The Constitution provides that the “judicial power of the United States, shall
be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to
time ordain and establish.” Id.
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desegregation,
and prison reform.
Without such
antitrust,
equitable powers, court-issued mandates would lack potency and
credibility. Equitable powers, the “formidable” power of contempt
among them, are those that give court decisions their “bite” and are
264
thus critical to the judiciary. The decision of the Second Circuit
ignores this truth and pegs the court’s equitable powers to the desires
of the SEC.
B. Ignoring Hecht and Its Progeny
One of the more striking features of the Second Circuit’s opinion
is the fact that it contains scant treatment of precedent. This is true of
controlling precedent from the Supreme Court and the Second
Circuit, as well as persuasive precedent from other circuits. Despite
the Second Circuit’s nonchalance on this point, precedent is very
informative of the dispute in Citigroup.
Like Hecht, the analysis begins with the relevant statutory
265
language. The SEC brought its case against Citi under the 1933
266
Act. Section 20(b) of that Act provides for statutory injunctions:
Whenever . . . any person is engaged or about to engage in any acts
or practices which constitute or will constitute a violation of the
provisions of this subchapter, or of any rule or regulation prescribed
under authority thereof, the Commission may, in its discretion, bring
an action in any district court of the United States . . . to enjoin such
acts or practices, and upon a proper showing, a permanent or
temporary injunction or restraining order shall be granted without
267
bond.

261. See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 101–05 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(discussing injunctions in the antitrust context).
262. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955) (“In fashioning and
effectuating the decrees, the courts will be guided by equitable principles. Traditionally, equity
has been characterized by a practical flexibility in shaping its remedies and by a facility for
adjusting and reconciling public and private needs.” (footnotes omitted)).
263. See, e.g., Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1947 (2011) (using injunctive relief to impose
prison-population limits to ensure prisoners’ Eighth Amendment rights were protected).
264. See SEC v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc. (Citigroup I), 827 F. Supp. 2d 328, 332 (S.D.N.Y.
2011) (“But when a public agency asks a court to become its partner in enforcement by
imposing wide-ranging injunctive remedies on a defendant, enforced by the formidable judicial
power of contempt, the court, and the public, need some knowledge of what the underlying facts
are . . . .”).
265. Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 321–22 (1944).
266. SEC v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc. (Citigroup IV), 752 F.3d 285, 289 (2d Cir. 2014).
267. Securities Act of 1933 § 20(d), 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) (2012).
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A long line of Supreme Court cases holds that, unless the
governing statute contains express language circumscribing the
discretion of district courts, the background principles of equity
268
remain in force. The above language is far from the “inescapable
inference” required by Warner Holding Co. to conclude that the
269
discretion of the district court is in some way curtailed. In fact, in
270
Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co. the Supreme Court held that the
statutory language of the 1934 Act, substantially similar to that of the
1933 Act, did not restrict courts’ discretion: “[W]e cannot fairly infer
from the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 a purpose to circumscribe
271
the courts’ power to grant appropriate remedies.”
At the risk of trivializing this plain yet important point, the
Supreme Court in Hecht held that, even when a statute uses more
restrictive language, it is still entirely within a court’s purview to
272
determine the propriety of injunctive relief. In addition, the Hecht
Court specifically cited the 1933 and 1934 Acts as containing language
273
that requires judicial discretion. Having thus established that the
operative statutory language does not circumscribe the discretion of
courts, it follows that “[t]he decision to grant or deny permanent
injunctive relief is an act of equitable discretion by the district
274
court.” The panel in Citigroup all but rejected this rule by vesting
the primary consideration in equitable relief—the public interest—
275
with the SEC. A reviewing court under Citigroup is thus confined to
reviewing the “procedural propriety” of the consent decree, and
absent any irregularities must generally issue the injunction as
276
sought.
Courts have a duty to independently assess the merits of a
277
proposed consent decree. The court’s ultimate decision is to be
268. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391–92 (2006); Porter v. Warner
Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398 (1946); Hecht Co., 321 U.S. at 330.
269. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. at 398.
270. Mills v. Elec. Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
271. Id. at 391.
272. Hecht Co., 321 U.S. at 591.
273. Id. at 331 n.7.
274. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
275. See SEC v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc. (Citigroup IV), 752 F.3d 285, 296 (2d Cir. 2014)
(“The job of determining whether the proposed SEC consent decree best serves the public
interest, however, rests squarely with the SEC . . . .”).
276. Id. at 295–96.
277. Id. at 293; see Arizona v. City of Tucson, 761 F.3d 1005, 1012 (9th Cir. 2014) (discussing
independent review in the context of CERCLA consent decrees); City of Detroit v. Grinnell
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based on the entirety of the attendant circumstances and “all those
considerations of fairness that have been the traditional concern of
279
equity courts.” Further, courts have a “duty to inquire into the
technical terms and factual disputes underlying the proposed
280
settlement” and are compelled to “take genuine account of ‘the
281
equities.’” It is thus plain that the Second Circuit’s preoccupation
with procedural correctness, as opposed to substantive or factual
propriety, is largely misplaced and incorrect as a matter of law. The
topical considerations authorized by the court fall far short of the
searching review that should, and traditionally has, characterized
equitable practice.
As a trial judge, Judge Rakoff was in the best possible position to
view and assess the factual record. Presiding over the proceedings,
Judge Rakoff was able to witness the candor and forthrightness of the
parties. To borrow language from the Second Circuit, he was “on the
282
firing line and [able to] evaluate the action accordingly.”
Conversely, the appeals panel had only a second-order view of the
283
record that, from its lofty vantage point, it found it sufficient. The
Second Circuit went so far as to say that short of collusion, district
284
courts should be satisfied by the averments of the SEC alone.
285
Averments are, by definition, unproven. It is difficult to reconcile
the long-standing requirement that courts satisfy themselves of the
factual underpinnings of equitable relief and the position of the
Second Circuit, which essentially asks courts to take the SEC at its
word.
Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 462 (2d Cir. 1974) (stating that courts are to “eschew any rubber stamp
approval in favor of an independent evaluation”).
278. See SEC v. Culpepper, 270 F.2d 241, 250 (2d Cir. 1959) (“The chancellor’s decision is
based on all the circumstances . . . .”).
279. SEC v. Manor Nursing Ctrs., Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1102 (2d Cir. 1972).
280. United States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 540 F. Supp. 1067, 1072 (W.D.N.Y.
1982).
281. FTC v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 665 F.2d 1072, 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
282. See Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d at 454 (“Great weight is accorded his [the trial judge’s]
views because he is exposed to the litigants, and their strategies, positions and proofs. He is
aware of the expense and possible legal bars to success. Simply stated, he is on the firing line
and can evaluate the action accordingly.” (alteration in original) (quoting Ace Heating &
Plumbing Co., Inc. v. Crane Co., 453 F.2d 30, 43 (3d Cir. 1971))).
283. SEC v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc. (Citigroup IV), 752 F.3d 285, 296 (2d Cir. 2014).
284. Id.
285. Averments, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2014) (defining averments as “positive
declaration or affirmation of fact; esp., an assertion or allegation in a pleading” (emphasis
added)).
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As discussed in connection with Bonastia, a failure “to apply
well-settled legal precepts to a conceded set of facts” is an abuse of
286
discretion. The Second Circuit would lead one to believe this was
the case in Citigroup. But as far as Judge Rakoff was concerned, there
was no set of conceded facts. Judge Rakoff was thus doing little more
than conducting his own independent factual analysis as called for by
287
Hooker, and a much more limited inquiry at that. Had his factual
questions been answered, he likely would have approved the
settlement—this is precisely what occurred in SEC v. Bank of
288
America. There, Judge Rakoff initially refused to enter a consent
decree for want of facts, but, after receiving additional information
from the parties, approved the settlement. Importantly, the
admissions of the bank stopped short of admitting liability, thus
foreclosing on collateral exposure and providing a model of what a
289
factually robust settlement with Citi could have looked like.
By far the most shocking aspect of the Second Circuit’s opinion
was the degree of deference afforded to the SEC in determining what
290
satisfied the public interest. The court held unequivocally that
“[t]he job of determining whether the proposed SEC consent decree
best serves the public interest, however, rests squarely with the SEC,
291
and its decisions merit significant deference.”
This level of
292
deference is akin to Chevron deference, and although Chevron
deference might often be a safe harbor for agencies when engaged in
rulemaking, it seems that the Second Circuit ceded too much judicial

286. SEC v. Bonastia, 614 F.2d 908, 913 (3d Cir. 1980).
287. See United States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 540 F. Supp. 1067, 1071–72
(W.D.N.Y. 1982).
288. See SEC v. Bank of Am. Corp., Nos. 09 Civ. 6829 (JSR), 10 Civ. 0215 (JSR), 2010 WL
624581, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2010).
289. Id.; see Coffee, supra note 17, at 1 (discussing parallels between Citigroup and Bank of
America).
290. SEC v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc. (Citigroup IV), 752 F.3d 285, 297 (2d Cir. 2014).
291. Id. at 296.
292. Chevron deference is a two-step test applied to agency actions to determine whether
the action is lawful. A court first asks whether Congress has spoken directly to the relevant
question. If so, the court and the agency must adhere to the will of Congress. If Congress has
not spoken directly to the issue however, the agency action will be upheld so long as it is based
on a permissible reading of the statute. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).
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authority to the SEC by extending Chevron-level deference to
293
considerations of equity—the domain of courts.
The panel did itself a further disservice by relying on Chaney for
the proposition that the SEC’s enforcement action was committed to
294
the Commission’s discretion by law, and thus was unreviewable.
There the agency decision being challenged was the decision not to
take enforcement action. As Chief Justice Rehnquist reasoned,
decisions not to act do not involve “coercive power” on the part of an
agency. The situation in Citigroup was precisely the opposite: the
SEC was acting affirmatively, and its request for injunctive relief does
implicate coercive power over those areas traditionally protected by
courts. The Second Circuit’s reliance on Chaney is not only mistaken,
295
but also undermines its conclusion.
Many circuits have held that the most important factor in
determining the degree of deference afforded to a party seeking
approval of a consent decree is “the persuasive power of the agency’s
296
proposal and rationale.” Apparently, the Second Circuit was so
impressed by the strength of the SEC’s case that it felt it necessary to
cede the bench’s most essential function to the SEC in this and all
297
future cases. This is a remarkable result considering the lack of
298
stipulations of fact. How can a trial judge be convinced of the
relative strengths of the parties’ positions when there are no factual

293. See Chris Rice, Injunctive Relief and Judicial Deference, COLUM. BUS. L. REV. ONLINE
(Apr. 8, 2012, 5:21 PM), http://cblr.columbia.edu/archives/12065 [http://perma.cc/3QQL-EHGN]
(describing the misplaced reliance on Chevron).
294. SEC v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc. (Citigroup IV), 752 F.3d 285, 297 (2d Cir. 2014).
295. See Rice, supra note 293. (“Heckler concerned a decision by an administrative agency
not to pursue injunctive relief; while a request for injunctive relief involves the court’s
conception of the public interest, the absence of such a request does not involve the court in the
same way.”).
296. FTC v. Standard Fin. Mgmt. Corp., 830 F.2d 404, 407 (1st Cir. 1987); see EEOC v.
Hiram Walker & Sons, Inc., 768 F.2d 884, 889 (7th Cir. 1985) (stating that a district court should
compare “the strengths of the plaintiffs’ case versus the amount of the settlement offer”); Walsh
v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., Inc., 726 F.2d 956, 966 (3d Cir. 1983) (stating that the most
important consideration in reviewing a settlement in the class-action context is whether the
underlying claims could be proven); Flinn v. FMC Corp., 528 F.2d 1169, 1173 (4th Cir. 1975)
(stating that a court may approve a settlement when “the record before it is adequate to reach
‘an intelligent and objective opinion of the probabilities of ultimate success should the claim be
litigated’” (citation omitted)).
297. Citigroup IV, 752 F.3d at 296.
298. See SEC v. Citigroup Glob. Mkts., Inc. (Citigroup I), 827 F. Supp. 2d 328, 330 (S.D.N.Y.
2011) (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (noting that the court cannot approve settlement due to lack of “proven
or admitted facts”).
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stipulations and the defendant neither admits nor denies the
allegations?
On this analysis, the Second Circuit relinquished a critical role of
the judiciary to the SEC. The court rationalized that the SEC has a
299
constituency, whereas courts do not. This reasoning is flawed for
two reasons. First, the SEC’s Congressional “constituency” gave its
mandate to the SEC through the operative language of the Act, which
preserves the traditional role of the courts as the ultimate deciders of
whether an equitable remedy is appropriate. Second, even if the Act
is not read as explicitly preserving the courts’ role in this regard, the
Framers nonetheless intended that courts act as a check on the whims
of the executive and legislative branches. Excesses of Congress or the
executive branch cannot be justified on the basis of their
constituencies; the SEC has always had a Congressional constituency
to which it must answer, there is nothing new or different in this case
that justifies allowing the Commission to overstep its bounds. Not
only is the ruling flawed and grounded in untenable justifications, but
the decision has important, underanalyzed consequences moving
forward.
C. Implications of the Flawed Ruling
A question that arises naturally from the Second Circuit’s
decision is the degree of discretion that remains for courts in granting
their judicial imprimatur after Citigroup. Another related question is
whether there were any other courses of action Judge Rakoff could
have taken to avoid issuing an injunction.
As to the first question, the opinion in Citigroup makes clear that
a reviewing court’s analysis should be limited to the procedural
300
propriety of the consent decree. Other circuits have not winnowed
the role of reviewing courts to such a degree, however, and leave a
substantial basis for the conclusion that the role of courts is much
broader.
For example, the Hooker court recognized a duty to inquire into
301
the factual underpinnings of a consent decree. Along those lines,
the First Circuit in Standard Financial, the Fourth Circuit in Flinn v.

299. Citigroup IV, 752 F.3d at 296.
300. Id. at 295.
301. See United States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 540 F. Supp. 1067, 1072
(W.D.N.Y. 1982) (“[T]he reviewing court has a limited duty to inquire into the technical terms
and the factual disputes underlying the proposed settlement.”).
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302

FMC Corp., and the Seventh Circuit in Hiram Walker & Sons, Inc.,
all state that an important factor for a reviewing judge to consider is
303
the strength of the plaintiff’s case. Indeed, the Seventh Circuit
304
regards it as the most important factor. Elsewhere, judges consider
305
the substantive terms of consent decrees. Some courts go so far as to
require that the consent decree “represents a reasonable factual and
legal determination based on the facts of record, whether established
306
by evidence, affidavit, or stipulation.”
A recent student case comment proposes a district-court
standard of review restricted to “the adequacy of the individual
307
settlement package.” At the same time, the author characterizes
308
efforts to discern factual underpinnings as “overreaching.” This
seems to be a logical inconsistency; how can a judge possibly assess
the adequacy, or any aspect of a proposed consent decree, without
facts by which to measure it? In order to accord with the rich history
of equitable practice, and to allow judges the flexibility needed to
effect just results, reviewing judges should be given wide latitude to
inquire into the facts supporting a settlement. This is not to say they
will or should do so in every case, only that they should be permitted
to do so when they wish. For instance, courts might inquire into
evidence against the defendant, the negotiation process and how
settlement figures were calculated, how the SEC determined which
charges to levy, and how the SEC plans to monitor and enforce any
302. Flinn v. FMC Corp., 528 F.2d 1169 (4th Cir. 1975).
303. See id. at 1172 (“The most important factor to be considered in determining whether
there has been such a clear abuse of discretion is whether the trial court gave proper
consideration to the strength of the plaintiffs’ claims on the merits . . . .”); FTC v. Standard Fin.
Mgmt. Corp., 830 F.2d 404, 408 (1st Cir. 1987) (“[T]he true measure of the deference due
depends on the persuasive power of the agency's proposal and rationale, given whatever
practical considerations may impinge and the full panoply of the attendant circumstances.”);
EEOC v. Hiram Walker & Sons, Inc., 768 F.2d 884 (7th Cir. 1985) (listing “a comparison of the
strengths of plaintiffs’ case versus the amount of the settlement offer” as one of “the factors that
a district court should consider” in determining the “fairness” of a consent decree).
304. Hiram Walker & Sons, Inc., 768 F.2d at 889.
305. In re Tutu Water Wells CERCLA Litig., 326 F.3d 201, 207 (3d Cir. 2003).
306. United States v. City of Miami, 664 F.2d 435, 441 (5th Cir. 1981).
307. See Case Comment, Securities Regulation – Consent Decrees – Second Circuit Clarifies
that a Court’s Review of an SEC Settlement Should Focus on Procedural Propriety. – SEC v.
Citigroup Global Markets, Inc., 752 F.3d 285 (2d Cir. 2014), 128 HARV. L. REV. 1288, 1294
(2015). This is an especially interesting suggestion given that the Second Circuit removed
adequacy from the considerations of a district court in its decision. SEC v. Citigroup Glob.
Mkts., Inc. (Citigroup IV), 752 F.3d 285, at 294 (2d Cir. 2014).
308. See Case Comment, supra note 307, at 1291 (“Judge Rakoff overreached in his demand
that the SEC establish the ‘truth’ of the allegations against Citi.”).

EDWARDS IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2/21/2016 10:17 PM

2016] OF TRUTH, PRAGMATISM, AND SOUR GRAPES

1279

penalties extracted. To equate attempts to determine the factual
circumstances with admissions of liability mischaracterizes the
inquiry.
In response to the second question—alternative routes Judge
Rakoff could have taken—Judge Rakoff could have approved the
309
terms of the settlement less the injunctive elements. This conclusion
310
is bolstered by United States v. City of Miami, in which the Fifth
Circuit discussed hybrid consent judgments, those “based in part on
the parties’ settlement agreement and in part on the court’s own
311
judgment.” More generally, the Supreme Court’s announcement in
Yakus that courts sitting in equity “go much further both to give and
withhold relief” when the public interest is implicated than they do
when only private interests are concerned also lends support to this
312
idea. Admittedly, this result would have been a windfall for Citi, as
its punishment would have been less severe without the injunctive
elements, but it would have sent a powerful message to the SEC—“if
a party seeks the legitimacy of the courts, it should be prepared to
play by the courts’ rules.” In addition to rebuking the SEC, such a
settlement would have deprived the SEC of nothing of practical value
313
as the SEC seldom enforces its injunctions.
Of course, the SEC also had alternatives, the most obvious being
a settlement with Citi outside of the courts. That the SEC did not
choose this path means that it thinks that a court-approved settlement
adds value to their enforcement, perhaps through the ostensible
legitimacy conferred by a court. Without an independent judiciary,
however, it is hard to see what substantive value a court might add. It

309. See Coffee, supra note 17, at 3 (arguing that if the SEC itself pursued a settlement
without injunctions, it likely could extract higher monetary penalties).
310. United States v. City of Miami, 664 F.2d 435 (5th Cir. 1981).
311. See id. at 440 (“Complete accord on all issues, however, is not indispensable to the
entry of any order. Even in a two-party litigation the parties may agree on as much as they
can . . . and call upon the court to decide the issues they cannot resolve. Thus, there may be a
decree ‘partially consensual and partially litigated.’” (citations omitted) (quoting High v. Braniff
Airways, Inc., 592 F.2d 1330, 1335 (5th Cir. 1979))).
312. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 441 (1944).
313. See Brief of Amici Curiae Securities Law Scholars for Affirmance in Support of the
District Court’s Order and Against Appellant and Appellee, SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts.
Inc., 752 F.3d 285 (2d Cir. 2014) (No. 11-5227-cv), 2012 WL 7009633, at *15 (“[T]he SEC rarely
seeks to hold a defendant in contempt for breach of an injunction . . . .”); Coffee, supra note 17,
at 3 (“Nor is it credible that injunctive relief is that important to the SEC . . . because the SEC
never seeks to enforce its injunctions through contempt.”).

EDWARDS IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1280

2/21/2016 10:17 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 65:1241

is plain that the SEC sought the legitimacy and imprimatur of the
courts, yet did not wish to pay for it.
CONCLUSION
314

A court’s injunctive power should not be wielded casually.
When the SEC seeks to invoke the equitable power of courts, it ought
315
to be prepared to justify its need with factual support. Contrary to
what commentators and the SEC itself argued, this does not require
316
an admission of liability and resulting collateral exposure.
In SEC v. Citigroup Global Markets, the Second Circuit’s flawed
decision restricted the role of judges reviewing consent decrees to
ensuring that the proposed settlement is procedurally proper.
Further, the Second Circuit gave excessive deference to the SEC and
its determination of what constitutes the public interest. Because the
public interest is the primary consideration in the decision to grant or
deny equitable relief, the Second Circuit relegated courts to the role
of mere seconders to the whims of agencies. In so holding, the Second
Circuit rejected precedent and violated separation-of-powers
principles.
Such a decision not only weakens the power of the judiciary to
effectively police ineffective enforcement by agencies, but also serves
to undermine the enforcement of the securities laws. Instead of
deferring to the SEC, courts should be granted discretion to inquire
into the factual underpinnings of government settlements when those
settlements make use of judicial imprimatur. The goal of efficient
capital aggregation and allocation is only furthered by effective and
meaningful enforcement of the securities laws. The trivialization of
courts in this goal serves only to trivialize the goal itself.

314. See SEC v. Commonwealth Chem. Sec., Inc., 574 F.2d 90, 99 (2d Cir. 1978) (explaining
that “collateral consequences of an injunction can be very grave” and describing judicial
reticence to issue injunctions); see also United States v. Local 1804-1, Int’l Longshoremen’s
Ass’n, 44 F.3d 1091, 1095 (2d Cir. 1995) (describing contempt as “among the most formidable
weapons in the court's arsenal”).
315. See Coffee, supra note 17, at 4 (stating that “courts should seek a full explanation of the
enforcement agency’s reasoning and should have some factual understanding of the strength of
the case before imposing injunctive relief”). Professor Coffee helpfully illustrates a “semantic
bridge,” between the goals of airing adequate factual support and avoiding the effects of
collateral estoppel. Id. at 1. He points to the Bank of America and Goldman Sachs settlements
as evidence of such a viable middle ground. Id. at 2.
316. Id. at 4.

